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UNIVERSAL OWNERS, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND
STAKEHOLDERISM: HOW SHOULD UNIVERSAL OWNERS
VIEW CORPORATE PURPOSE?
Daniel Irvin
ABSTRACT
The rise of massive asset owners like large pension funds and sovereign
wealth funds has created interest in the phenomenon of Universal Owners. The
climate crisis, environmental degradation, and worsening inequality have also
led to challenges to the current models of corporate governance, with a
particular interest on the idea of corporate purpose. This paper fills a gap by
addressing the intersection of these two trends, proposing a framework by which
Universal Owners should view corporate purpose. I argue that from a returnsmaximizing perspective, Universal Owners should prefer a flavor of shareholder
primacy that believes the corporation’s purpose is to contribute to sustainable
economic growth. In the course of answering this question this paper also
advances our understanding of Universal Owners by clarifying the difference
between ESG investors and Universal Owners, and arguing for large index
funds to be treated as a type of Universal Owner. This paper also contributes to
the literature on heterogenous shareholder interests by identifying the potential
conflict between Universal-Owners and non-Universal Owners as another
example of this conflict, and one where current corporate law resolves against
Universal Owners.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper sets out to explain how a Universal Owner should think about
corporate purpose. Thus, it sits at the center of two ongoing issues in corporate
governance and corporate law: The debate over shareholder primacy versus
stakeholderism, and the rise of massive institutional investors as the dominant
force in public markets. In Section II, I define Universal Owners, give some
examples of issues they should care about, and explain who in the real-world
matches the definition. The two key takeaways from this section are the
distinction between the perspectives of an ESG investor and Universal Owner,
and the categorization of the largest index funds as a type of Universal Owner,
albeit one whose ownership is not quite as “universal” as the largest pension
funds or sovereign wealth funds. In Section III, I suggest that the Universal
Owner, while agreeing with the traditional shareholder primacy view on the
question of to whom management should be accountable, have a unique view on
corporate purpose. For the Universal Owner, the purpose of any one single firm
in the economy is to contribute to sustainable, long-term growth, broadly
defined. In Section IV, I address how Universal Owners may be able to
implement this vision of corporate purpose. In particular I focus on a barrier that
is barely addressed in the literature—that of fiduciary duties owed by
management to non-Universal Owners in the firm. Thus, the overall contribution
of this paper is to map out a suggested vision for corporate purpose from the
Universal Owner perspective, and to flag an important barrier to implementing
the Universal Owner perspective at firms.
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In answering the core question, this paper also explores several corollary
issues. First, it explains the difference between ESG investors’ 1 (another trend
that some hope will lead to a more sustainable economy) and Universal Owners’
perspectives on firms’ production of negative environmental externalities.
Section II.C.i explains that the ESG investor’s value proposition with respect to
negative externalities is that these are risks which will eventually be internalized
through mechanisms like reputational harm, government regulation, or changing
societal norms. In contrast, for the Universal Owner negative externalities are
not a risk, but an existing cost which they already (and will continue to) incur
due to their ownership of the assets which directly bear the cost of externalities.
Second, section II.D considers the Universal Owner concept in light of the rise
of massive index funds, owned by asset managers like Blackrock. It concludes
that index fund operators like Blackrock can be considered a type of Universal
Owner, but they do not fit as neatly into the concept as the archetypical Universal
Owners, public pension funds.
Section III answers the core question of the paper. It concludes that what the
Universal Owner should prefer is a type of shareholder primacy, which I refer
to as “Sustainable Growth Primacy.” In their ideal model of corporate purpose,
corporate managers and directors would remain solely accountable to
shareholders, but they would manage the firm not to maximize profits as such,
but to contribute to long-term sustainable growth across the Universal Owner’s
portfolio, i.e., the economy. In other words, the purpose of firms for Universal
Owners is to contribute to the maximization of the Universal Owner’s portfolio.
Certainly, all investors want firms to contribute to portfolio maximization. But
the non-Universal Owner either can avoid firm-produce externalities in part or
entirely, and so in practice “maximizing portfolio value” almost always means
“maximize firm value.” In contrast, because the Universal Owner cannot escape
externalities, maximizing portfolio value does not always entail maximizing
firm value.
Finally, Section IV examines the problem of heterogenous shareholder
interests in the context of Universal Owners and Sustainable Growth Primacy.
This issue is one that the Universal Owner literature has in large part ignored.
Corporate governance literature and courts have tried to deal with the problems
engendered by conflicts between shareholders over the future direction of the
firm, such as in the case of preferred versus common stockholders. Because

1 Universal Owners could also be considered “ESG investors” insofar as they also care about ESG issues.
But when this paper refers to “ESG investors” it is referring to non-Universal Owner investors who take ESG
issues into account in valuing firms.
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directors and managers owe fiduciary duties to the firm (and not directly to
shareholders) directors are essentially obligated to resolve conflicts in favor of
the shareholders whose interests are most coextensive with the firm’s.
Regardless of the resolution of the dispute, in an efficient market one would
expect all shareholders’ expectation about the short- and long-term of the firm
to be reflected in the stock price. Section IV examines how the Universal
Owner’s ability to implement their vision of corporate purpose at individual
firms will be stymied by the current structure of fiduciary duties. Additionally,
“efficient markets” is not a suitable consolation price for Universal Owners
because even a perfectly efficient market may not incorporate unpriced
externalities, as by definition, they do not harm firm value. It concludes by
proposing several solutions for Universal Owners, including focusing on policy
changes at the governmental level and adopting greater use of alternative
corporate forms like the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation.
Counterintuitively, alternative corporate forms’ alteration of fiduciary duties to
allow management to balance profitability with other concerns can actually be
in the interest of Universal Owners as it allows managers to adopt the same broad
perspective as Universal Owners.
Thus, the paper contributes to the literature around Universal Owners by
suggesting a viewpoint on corporate purpose for Universal Owners and flagging
an important barrier to the implementation of Universal Owner concepts. It also
contributes to corporate governance literature generally, by pointing out the
conflict between Universal Owners and other shareholders at firms is an extreme
example of the conflict between heterogenous shareholder interests.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II defines the Universal Owner,
including tracing a brief history of the concept, and explains what makes
Universal Owners unique as well as who should be considered a Universal
Owner. Section III argues that Universal Owners’ view on corporate purpose
should be a unique flavor of shareholder primacy. Section IV discusses
implementation issues as well as argues that the framework of Sustainable
Growth Primacy can help explain certain actions taken by Universal Owners.
Two caveats are worth raising at the start of the paper. First, when the
“interests” of Universal Owners are discussed, it is solely within the context of
maximizing portfolio returns. There may be characteristics of Universal Owners
that create other interests. For example, as representatives of workers, pension
funds may legitimately view the protection of worker rights as an “interest” of
theirs, while the national security of the state that owns a sovereign wealth fund
may be a legitimate interest as well for that fund. This may all be true, but this
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paper analyzes Universal Owners in their capacity as investors, and as such
defines interest in that manner. Second, the analysis is intended to be agnostic
as to whether the existence of Universal Owners is good for society, and whether
it would be socially optimal if Universal Owners were able to imprint their
vision of corporate purpose on firms. Regardless of personal views, the paper is
intended to answer the question: What vision of corporate purpose would be in
the best interests of Universal Owners? Whether or not it would be in the best
interests of society is an entirely separate question.
I. WHAT IS A UNIVERSAL OWNER?
A. Definition
The Universal Owner is an asset owner that is sufficiently diversified and
large that it essentially owns a slice of the entire national (or global) economy.
While there is a diversity of formulations of the concept, to be a Universal
Owner, the core features of the definition are that your holdings must both be 1)
vast and 2) diversified, and 3) your investment perspective must be long-term.2
These features are important, because the combination of them are necessary to
make the Universal Owner’s portfolio a representative slice of the economy. The
global economy consists of many firms, across many industries, and will exist
for the indefinite future, barring a complete collapse of civilization.
Diversification ensures the Universal Owner is not concentrated in a few
companies or a few industries, vastness ensures the Universal Owner will own
a non-de minimis stake in many companies within every industry, and long-term
orientation ensures that the Universal Owner also owns a piece of the future
economy. Owning a representative slice of the global economy in turn means
that Universal Owners essentially own the externalities of their portfolio firms,
and the performance of their portfolios depends upon the performance of the
economy as a whole. Definitions of the concept have varied in their language
2 See James Hawley and Andrew Williams, The Emergence of Universal Owners: Some Implications of
Institutional Equity Ownership, 43 CHALLENGE 43, 45 (2000) (“the quintessential universal are the largest of
the public and private pension funds because they have amassed investment portfolios that naturally comprise a
broad cross section of the financial assets available for investment, and their objective - to provide pensions naturally gives them a long- term perspective toward wealth maximization.” Emphasis added); PWC, THE SDG
INVESTMENT CASE 16 (2017) (“Large institutional investors relying on modern portfolio theory can be
considered “universal owners”: their highly-diversified, long-term portfolios are sufficiently representative of
global capital markets that they effectively hold a slice of the overall market, making their investment returns
dependent on the continuing good health of the overall economy.” Emphasis Added); TRUCOST, WHY
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 3 (2010) (“Large institutional investors
are, in effect, “Universal Owners”, as they often have highly-diversified and long-term portfolios that are
representative of global capital markets.” Emphasis Added)
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and focus. Some highlight the connection between portfolio performance and
economic growth:
The fundamental characteristic of a universal owner is that it cares not
only about the governance and performance of the individual
companies that compose its investment portfolio, but that it also cares
about the performance of the economy as a whole… it “owns” the
economy (typically, a highly representative sample of the economy)
and, therefore, bears the costs of any shortfall in economic efficiency
and reaps the rewards of any improvement.3

Other definitions highlight the ownership of externalities as the most
important characteristic to focus on. Quigley’s 2019 literature review concludes
that most definitions have focused on “the concept of a portfolio so large and
diversified that it is difficult or impossible to sell out of externality-producing
firms; the costs of firm specific externalities are borne across the remainder of
the holdings.”4 There is little substantive disagreement between the two lines of
definitions. Definitions that discuss global economic growth also emphasize that
the production of negative externalities is the mechanism by which the Universal
Owner’s portfolio is harmed.5 Definitions that emphasize ownership of
externalities also suggest that returns are dependent upon general
macroeconomic performance.6 Yet there are two important takeaways from
comparing the two definitions.
First, emphasizing the connection between overall economic performance
and returns opens up a broader landscape of issues that Universal Owners should
be concerned with it. In the Universal Ownership context, ownership of
externalities is often conceived of as primarily bearing the cost of negative
externalities.7 But positive externalities exist as well—education and industrial
research and development have positive spillover effects on economic growth
beyond their benefits to the firm.8 Emphasizing the connection between
3

Hawley and Williams, supra note 2, at 45; see also PWC, supra note 2, at 16.
Ellen Quigley, Universal Ownership in the Anthropocene, SSRN ELECTRONIC J., 4 (2019); see also Raj
Thamotheram and Helen Wildsmith, Increasing Long-Term Market Returns: realising the potential of collective
pension fund action, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L REV. 438, 438 (2007) (“The UO hypothesis states that
although a large long-term investor with a diverse investment portfolio can initially benefit from an investee
company externalising costs, the investor might ultimately experience a reduction in market and portfolio returns
due to these externalities adversely affecting returns from other assets”)
5 PWC, supra note 2, at 16.
6 CONFERENCE REPORT, UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 6 (2006)
7 Quigley, supra note 4 at 4 (“the costs of firm specific externalities are borne across the remainder of
holdings”)
8 Margaret Stevens, A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition, 46 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 537, (1994) (discussing worker training); Bronwyn Hall, Jacques Mairesse, Pierre Mohnen,
4
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economic growth and returns shows that increasing these positive externalities
could be a goal of Universal Owners. Additionally, there are harms to economic
growth and economic performance that are not typically conceived of as
externalities. For example, monopolistic pricing is generally viewed as welfare
reducing, and thus harmful to economic performance,9 but it is not really an
externality. If the Universal Owner should primarily focus on economic growth,
then they would have reasons to oppose monopolistic behavior by portfolio
companies.
Second, the emphasis on economic performance and returns seems to ignore
the plausible possibility that there exist policies and mechanisms that increase
economic growth (thus increasing returns to Universal Owners in the first
instance) by decreasing the share of national income to capital (and increasing
it to labor) by such an extent as to wipe out the Universal Owner’s gains from
the increased growth. For example, suppose a national government had a policy
of buying private firms and turning them into worker cooperatives. If the worker
cooperatives were more productive than the previous method of ownership, then
the effect on economic growth could be positive. Yet if the Universal Owner lost
portfolio companies to this policy, it is plausible that they would see a decrease
in overall returns. Less extreme versions of this scenario could be increases in
minimum wage or increases in unionization levels. It is probably true (to an
extent) that—as some have argued—improving the status of labor and
supporting a strong middle class is beneficial to Universal Owners because it
increases economic growth, and the Universal Owner can reap those benefits. 10
However, it seems probable that this win-win dynamic will not be universally
true for all possible policies and forms of economic organization. Moreover,
policies that do not improve economic growth, but increase the share of national
income to capital, would seem to be desirable from the Universal Owner
perspective.
Taking these insights altogether, my definition of the Universal Owner for
this paper will be that a Universal Owner is an investor who, because of their
size, diversification, and long-term investment horizon, cannot escape the
spillover effects (both positive and negative) of portfolio company behavior, and

Measuring the Returns to R&D, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1033 (research and
development)
9 Deadweight
Loss,
CORPORATE
FINANCE
INSTITUTE,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/deadweight-loss/ (last accessed May 24,
2021)
10 See OECD, UNDER PRESSURE: THE SQUEEZED MIDDLE CLASS 17-18 (2019) (summarizing the
productivity and growth benefits of a strong middle class)
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as such as an interest in minimizing the negative spillover effects and
maximizing the positive spillover effects. Spillover effects are essentially
externalities, and I will use the terms fairly interchangeably in the paper, but it
useful to explicitly flag that I am conceiving of externalities in the broadest
possible manner.
B. History of the Concept
The concept of the Universal Owner is usually credited to Robert A.G.
Monks and Nell Minow’s 1995 textbook on corporate governance.11 Though the
textbook does not use the specific phrase “universal owner”, in its section on
pension funds it describes them in terms clearly foreshadowing the universal
owner concept:
pensions are becoming indexed equity holdings. This makes them both
universal and permanent shareholders. Their holdings are so
diversified that they have the incentive to represent the ownership
sector (and the economy) generally rather than any specific industries
or companies. This endows them with a breadth of concern that
naturally aligns with the public interest.12

Hawley and Williams in 2000 appear to be the first to explicitly use the term
“universal owners” to describe this phenomenon.13 One point worth noting about
this early development, and the subsequent development in the 2000s, is that it
came out of the corporate governance literature, from writers focused on pension
funds. Monks and Minow introduced the concept in their book on corporate
governance. In 2007, the journal “Corporate Governance, An International
Review” had a special edition on Universal Owners.14 Given that a 2019
literature review only found seventeen articles whose primary focus was
Universal Ownership,15 the seven articles in that special edition comprise a
significant proportion of the scholarship directly focused on the concept. Hawley
and Williams (responsible for five of the seventeen articles mentioned)16 as well
as Monks, are also scholars of “fiduciary capitalism.” Fiduciary capitalism refers
11

See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6; PWC, supra note 2, at 16 (footnote 14).
ROBERT A.G. MONKS AND NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 132 (1st ed. 1995). Note that the
exact language is repeated in the most recent edition of the book. ROBERT A.G. MONKS AND NELL MINOW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 167 (5th ed. 2011)
13 See Hawley and Williams, supra note 2, at 44 (“Following Robert Monks and Nell Minow, corporate
governance activists and authors of Corporate Governance and the principals of Lens Inc., we argue that many
of these large fiduciary institutions are “universal owners.”)
14 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L REV. 415, 415-497 (2007)
15 Quigley, supra note 4 at 3
16 Quigley, supra note 4 at 3 (footnote 1)
12
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to the rise of institutional investors, who are investing on behalf of underlying
beneficiaries,17 as the dominant model of ownership in public markets.18 Pension
funds are the preeminent example of these investors, along with mutual funds
and university endowments.19
Following this definition, the concept was further developed in both
academic and non-academic literature in the 2000s.20 Quigley’s 2019 literature
review contains a good summary of the variety of critiques of Universal Owner
theory.21 While most critiques accept a basic version of Universal Owner
theory—that sufficiently large asset owners bear externalized costs—they tend
to focus on either the desirability of acting upon these insights or the practical
ability of Universal Owners to actually implement the insights. On the former,
some have raised concerns that Universal Owner theory will be used to smuggle
in political goals that are disconnected from financial goals. 22 On the latter,
Universal Owners do not always seem to behave in the way they should, 23 and I
think this set of barriers address the issue of why. The two barriers that seem
most on point are institutional barriers like the short-term incentives facing fund
managers, and the lack of actionable data to support specific actions. While
Universal Owners may have ultra-long-term interests, a pension fund does not
make decisions—the managers of pension funds make decisions. For the fund
manager, they may view discount future returns because they believe they are
being judged on short-term targets and performance.24 Many public pension

17

Hawley and Williams, supra note 2, at 44 (“The beneficial claims on the assets of these fiduciary
institutions are a form of indirect or mediated ownership because they represent claims to payments rather than
alienable claims to the equity or debt instrument itself. Similarly, mutual funds represent merely a claim on
residual gains (or losses), not on the actual stock certificate itself.”)
18 Robert A.G. Monks, Two Challenges for Fiduciary Capitalism, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L REV.
486, 486 (2007)
19 See id. at 487
20 Robert Urwin, Pension Funds as Universal Owners: Opportunity Beckons and Leadership Calls, 4
ROTMAN INT’ L J. OF PENSION MGMT. 26, 27 (2011)
21 Quigley, supra note 4, at 5-8
22 Ola Peter Krohn Gjessing and Henrik Syse, Norwegian Petroleum Wealth and Universal Ownership, 15
CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L REV. 427, 434 (2007)
23
See Quigley, supra note 3, at 7 (“Further critiques of Universal Ownership Theory include the charge
that large institutional investors do not appear to behave like Universal Owners (Richardson, 2015; Richardson
and Peihani, 2015). Indeed, a survey of hundreds of European investors found that only 3% of them are yet
compliant with the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II, a set of corporate governance requirements that are very
much in line with Universal Ownership (Hermes EOS, 2019). Hawley (2011) suggests that Universal Owners
contributed to the 2008 financial crisis by failing to perform the basic corporate governance and risk analysis
functions that their nature as Universal Owners arguably demanded”)
24 Urwin, supra note 20, at 27; see also Monks, supra note 18 (arguing that the promise of fiduciary
capitalism will never be fulfilled unless institutions actually participate as owners in companies, fulfill their
fiduciary duties, and fund managers stop outsourcing their duties to consultants who add little value)
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funds are underfunded relative to liabilities,25 and so there is naturally going to
be pressure to attempt to make up the gap in the short term and let the next
generation of managers worry about future performance. Another form of
institutional barriers is the fact that many large asset owners like pension funds
rely on advisers and consultants for investment decisions, and often invest
through asset managers that have less of a long-term orientation.26 They do this
in part because the trustees believe relying on “experts” will protect them from
litigation risks from their own beneficiaries.27 Finally, it may be easy to say
generally that negative externalities hurt portfolio performance, but it is not easy
to quantify these costs. As one source puts it “asset owners have found the
financial case hard to express and validate.”28 For example, even the largest,
most diversified asset owner on Earth likely will not bear a proportional slice of
the externalities caused by climate change—given that there are areas of the
world that are fairly disconnected from the global economy.29
C. Externalities and Portfolio Returns
As discussed above, what makes a Universal Owner unique relative to the
traditional conception of a shareholder is their relationship to portfolio
companies’ externalities. The traditional story for externalities implicitly
assumes that if the firm benefits from the externality, its owners must as well
(financially at least). The train is driving along the railway; the soot it produces
damages the clothes drying at a neighboring laundromat; forcing the laundromat
to cut its output because it can only dry clothes when trains are not running. In
this simple story, we may assume that the train owner benefits from imposing
this cost on the laundromat. This is certainly true where the firm owner’s only
financial asset is their share in the firm producing the externality. In that
scenario, the owner would be able to avoid 100% of the externalized costs. The
same logic is true for owners that have interests in multiple corporations and
other asset classes, especially if they actively manage their ownership stakes. In
such a scenario, the odds of me holding the asset that bears the externalized costs
25 See Dan Walters, California’s immense pension dilemma, CALMATTERS (Aug. 10, 2020)
https://calmatters.org/commentary/dan-walters/2020/08/california-court-pension-debt-unfunded/ (reporting that
CalPERS is only 70.8% funded based “based on an assumption of future investment earnings averaging 7% a
year, which probably is at least one or two percentage points too high.”)
26 Matthew Kieran, Universal Owners and ESG: Leaving Money on the Table?, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE
AN INT’L REV. 478, 482-83 (2007)
27 Monks, supra note 18, at 491
28 Urwin, supra note 20, at 27
29 See Gjessing and Syse, supra note 22, at 432 (“pollution that reduces agricultural output in a poor, remote
and self-sufficient community raises ethical and possibly political issues, but may not hit the typical institutional
rich-world investor financially”)
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of another portfolio company’s behavior are fairly low. Even if I could not divest
myself of the proverbial laundromat, it is unlikely that I am bearing the full cost
of the externality if I do not own any of the other three laundromats along the
railroad. But because the universal owner essentially owns a representative slice
of the economy, it cannot escape its portfolio companies’ externalities. One way
or another, it will pay the bill. Returning to the analogy of the laundromat once
more, the Universal Owner will own both a small piece of the railroad, as well
as a small piece of every business directly adjacent to the railroad, as well as a
small piece of every creditor and supplier of each of those businesses.
To put it in mathematical terms, if the Universal Owner owns 1% of every
company in the economy, then it would get 1% of the benefit of externalizing
the cost (i.e., 1% of the increased profits of the railroad) as well as 1% of the
present and future externalized costs (i.e., 1% of the lost profits to the companies
bearing the cost). Because they own a representative slice of the economy, they
will own an equal share of the of the benefit and an equal share of the cost, and
so they should compare the overall cost to the overall benefit. Thus, whether the
Universal Owner benefits from the externality depends on whether the net
present value (“NPV”) of the firm-specific benefits is greater than the NPV of
the portfolio wide losses. It should be clear that the benefit here is not the profits
from the externality-causing activity, but the money saved by not internalizing
the externality. These numbers will be different when there are actions that a
firm can take to internalize externalities without ceasing the activity entirely. For
example, if the railroad could install scrubbers to reduce soot, or use a different
form of coal that produced less soot. Thus, it is the Universal Owner’s interest
to compare the cheapest method of reducing the externalized costs to the actual
reduction in externalized costs.
There is an important qualification to this story. This is the fact that if a firm’s
overall value to the Universal Owner is negative (i.e., the externalized costs
exceed profits) it might lead to the conclusion that the firm should simply stop
operating, if it cannot find a cheaper way to reduce the externality. However,
this ignores the fact that the Universal Owner will also own businesses that rely
on that firm. Whether they are suppliers to the firm, creditors, or customers—
their earnings will be harmed if the firm simply closes up shop and stops doing
business. The railroad may be a crucial piece of infrastructure, and other
businesses owned by the Universal Owner may rely on it for transporting goods.
This example illustrates that even in the case of negative externalities, the firm
can still also have positive effects that are not captured in its annual profits. Thus,
unless the goods and services provided by the firm are perfectly substitutable
from other sources, it is likely that the Universal Owner would generally always
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prefer that firms stay in business while internalizing externalized costs. As a side
note, all of these nuances exemplify why the critique discussed in section II.B
as to the lack of actionable data rings true: Even if we know the Universal Owner
bears some portion of the externalized cost, it is not always clear what that
portion is or what would be the consequences of internalizing the cost.
One crucial aspect of this theory is that it is fundamentally different from the
argument that producing externalities hurts a firm’s financial well-being, i.e., the
argument made by ESG investors.30 ESG investors might argue that
externalizing costs harms the company itself, because of reputational harm 31 or
because eventually regulatory action will force the company to externalize the
cost.32 Thus, an ESG investor might change their valuation of the railroad
company because they believe eventually regulators will force the company to
internalize the cost through mandates, or that the company may be liable in court
for damages to the laundromat. To use a real-world example, part of the value
proposition behind climate-related ESG investing is that eventually a carbon tax
or other form of climate policy will be implemented, forcing fossil fuel and other
carbon-intensive companies to internalize the cost of emissions, which in turn
will reduce their ability to provide value for shareholders. While the Universal
Owner may also be concerned with such a prospect, they are fundamentally
different from the ESG in that they already (and will continue to) bear the costs
of the externality through its effect on other portfolio companies. In other words,
what the ESG investor identifies as risks to the firm (environmental and social
externalities), are simply already existing costs to Universal Owner. Thus, the
“standard” investor, the ESG investor, and the Universal Owner all have
different perspectives on whether a firm should engage in any course of action
where they will generate externalities, again broadly defined to include positive
externalities and other actions with negative effects on economic growth like
monopolistic price-setting:

30 See, e.g., Charles Wallace, When “Externalities” Aren’t External: Poor ESG Exposure Leads to
Increased Risk, IMPACTIVATE (Dec. 21, 2017) https://www.theimpactivate.com/when-externalities-arentexternal-poor-esg-exposure-leads-to-increased-risk/
31 See FactSet Insight, Corporate Governance, Reputational Risk, and why ESG Matters, FACTSET (Jan.
2,
2020)
https://insight.factset.com/corporate-governance-reputational-risk-and-why-esg-matters-keytakeaways
32 See Simon Thomas, Robert Repetto, and Daniel Dias, Integrated Environmental and Financial
Performance Metrics for Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L
REV. 421, 422 (2007) (“Mainstream investors also must have an interest in external environmental costs because
environmental laws, regulations and emissions trading schemes increasingly act to internalise these costs for
companies”)
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Firms should engage in an action when…
The NPV of cash flows generated is positive
The NPV of cash flows generated is positive,
adjusted by the expected value of externality
internalization
(risk
of
forcible
internalization * magnitude of effect of
internalization)
The NPV of cash flows generated is positive,
adjusted for the externalities produced by
action.

As discussed in section II.A, the effect of externalities on portfolio returns
can be conceptualized as either a direct effect on portfolio company
performance33 or as a process where externalities affect economic growth, and
the reduction (or increase) in economic growth in turn affects the long-term total
returns of stock indices, which are closely correlated with Universal owner
performance.34 Long-term returns from the stock market are the most important
influence on Universal Owner performance.35 The total return from the stock
market is driven by three components: Dividend yields, growth in profits and
changes in valuation.36 Growth in profits is the most important component, and
the growth rate of profits “is primarily a function of overall economic
expansion.”37
Regardless of the mechanism, one of the main critiques of Universal Owner
theory is the difficulty operationalizing these insights. It may be accurate on a
general level, but that does not provide actionable insights for Universal Owners.
Discussing the lack of universal owner pressure on tobacco companies in the
1990s, one paper reported that they were aware of the significant negative
33

TRUCOST, supra note 2, at 8; CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4
Steve Lippman, Daniel Rosan, and Adam Seitchik, Why Lower Drug Prices Benefit Institutional
Investors: an application of universal ownership theory, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE AN INT’L REV. 455, 459 (2007);
Thamotheram and Helen Wildsmith, supra note 4, at 437-38 (identifying three sources of long-term market
returns that in turn raise equilibrium growth rates and return on capital)
35 Id.; see also Gjessing and Syse, supra note 22, at 429 (“The idea that large institutional investors such
as Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global (managed by NBIM) can be characterised as universal owners
is now well established. The fund’s principal has set global benchmarks for both equity and fixed income, and a
maximum tracking error of 1.5 per cent. This means that the absolute return of the fund is strongly influenced
by the performance of the global equity market. For this reason, the fund’s long-term financial interest lies with
the ability of the global markets to produce sustainable economic growth, and with the functionality of the equity
market”)
36 Id.
37 Id.
34
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externalities caused by smoking but “it was felt that there was a lack of hard data
equivalent to financial data, which might justify stronger action.”38 To address
this issue, some researchers have attempted to quantify the effect of potential
externalities. From examining some of this work, climate change appears to be
the externality where researchers have had the most success in generating
detailed, granular, asset level data on the risks posed by it.
1. Environmental Externalities
A 2010 analysis by Trucost constructed a hypothetical $10 billion fund
invested in the MSCI All World Country Index, comprised of 2,439 companies
across developed and developing economies.39 They then looked at the impact
of five different environmental externalities upon the global economy and the
hypothetical fund (greenhouse gas emissions, water overuse, air pollution,
waste, and natural resource overuse).40 They hypothetical investor would be
proportionally responsible for $560 million of externalities caused by those
listed companies annually.41 The cost of the externalities equaled over 50% of
portfolio companies’ earnings.42 Globally, environmental externality costs were
an estimated $6.6 trillion, equivalent to 11% of the global economy at the time. 43
The top 3,000 companies by market capitalization generated $2.15 trillion of
those externalities.44 Not only would Universal Owners benefit from reducing
production of environmental externalities because of the direct reduction in
costs, the Porter Hypothesis suggests that when firms are forced to internalize
costs, the incentives given to them generates a search for “new, superior methods
of production”, making firms more profitable in the long-run.45
2. Climate Change
Climate change is an environmental externality. In the 2010 Trucost study,
emissions of greenhouse gases were responsible for the lion’s share of
externalized costs, $4.5 trillion of the $6.6 trillion.46 There is a growing body of
research and industry efforts to quantify climate risk at the asset level, such as
the services provided by the Rhodium Group to analyze risks to individual assets
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Hawley and Williams, supra note 2, at 52
TRUCOST, supra note 1 at 8
Id. at 4
Id. at 8
Id.
Id. at 4
Id. at 6
Thomas et al., supra note 32, at 422
Id. at 4
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and portfolios47 and the work of the Climate Impact Lab to produce community
level risk assessments.48 The risks to Universal Owners from climate change are
not limited to physical risks. As the prospect of significant long-term climate
damages becomes more apparent to investors, the risk of more immediate
portfolio losses increases as markets shift, with reductions in portfolio value of
up to 45%.49 Because Universal Owners can only hedge against losses to a
limited extent, the only way to prevent significant losses is to reduce the
externality. Finally, even though the losses are stark even at 2 or 3 degrees, there
is a small but non-zero probability of runaway climate change in the 6-to-7degree range, at which point the complete collapse of the human civilization as
we know it is a realistic possibility.50 One could conservatively estimate the
portfolio losses in that scenario to be roughly 100%.
3. Drug Pricing
Demonstrating the effect of high prescription drug costs on Universal
Owners is a useful exercise, because it could show how Universal Owners could
be affected by more than just the traditional environmental externality. As a
2007 study by Lippman et al., argued, drug pricing is the United States exhibits
feature of monopolistic pricing.51 Since markets with monopolistic pricing
exhibit deadweight loss, cutting drug prices should (in theory) increase total
welfare.52 The study modeled the effect on welfare and concluded significant
cuts in drug prices would be beneficial to the Universal Owner. 53 Since the
Universal Owner also owns the insurance companies that pay for drug prices,
they would share in the increase in consumer surplus.54 The government is also
a purchaser of drugs, and the cost savings from reduced drug pricing could
accrue to the Universal Owner through increased levels of consumption, or
government spending in other areas.55 Finally, if lower prices expand access to
drugs, the Universal Owner would benefit from the healthier, more productive

47 Climate Risk Service, RHODIUM GROUP, https://rhg.com/data_story/climate-risk-service/ (last accessed
May 19, 2021)
48
Our Approach, CLIMATE IMPACT LAB, https://www.impactlab.org/our-approach/ (last accessed May 19,
2021)
49 UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE SENTIMENT IMPACTS INVESTMENT , CISL 29 (2015)
50 Quigley, supra note 4 at 12; see also Will Stefen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the
Anthropocene, 115 PNAS (2018)
51 Lippman, Rosan, and Seitchik, supra note 34 at 457
52 Id. at 461
53 Id. at 455
54 Id. at 461
55 Id.

118

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 10

labor force in its other industries.56 While the socially optimal price of
prescription drugs may be debatable, this exercise is useful because it implies
that Universal Owners should oppose monopolies and oligopolies in industries.
The benefits they gain from the monopoly’s increased profits are offset by the
deadweight loss, which shows up as increased costs or foregone opportunities
for its other companies. One very pertinent current example in the
pharmaceutical world is the vaccine for Covid-19. There is an obvious financial
interest for Universal Owners in vaccinating the world as rapidly as possibly—
even if it cuts into the profits of Pfizer or Moderna, the benefits to other portfolio
companies (such as airlines) are much bigger. In practice, we have seen large
institutional investors like Blackrock urge pharmaceutical companies to
collaborate, not compete, to develop and produce the vaccine.57
4. Research and Development
Corporate research and development are examples of positive externalities—
the firm benefits from the research but there can be positive spillover effects into
other firms in the industry or even other industries. A 2010 meta-analysis found
that although rates of return on R&D were substantial, studies have consistently
shown that the social return was even greater due to positive spillover effects.58
Given that these spillover effects are often realized by firms in other industries,
the Universal Owner realizes a greater benefit from firm R&D than a normal
owner of the firm. This same basic dynamic is possibly present in other
situations where a firm-level investment produces public goods, such as
infrastructure and employee training.
II. WHO ARE THE UNIVERSAL OWNERS?
Now that we have a basic definition of the concept, and an understanding of
the unique perspectives they have on the firm, and firm activities, the final
relevant question is “who in the real world actually meets this definition?” The
literature views large public pension funds as the preeminent example of
universal owners.59 The largest asset owner in the world is the Japanese
government pension fund (GPIF) (with $1.6 trillion in assets). 60 Eleven of the
56

Id. at 462
Matt Levine, Investors want a cure, not a winner; BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2020)
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-24/investors-want-a-cure-not-a-winner; Matt Levine,
Index funds will save us, BLOOMBERG, (February 24, 2021)
58 Hall et al., supra note 7, at 1073 (see table 5 on page 1060 for a table containing results)
59 See Hawley and Williams, supra note 2, at 45; MONKS AND MINOW, supra note 12, at 132
60 THE THINKING AHEAD INSTITUTE, THE THINKING AHEAD I NSTITUTE’S ASSET OWNER 100:
57
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largest twenty-five asset owners are pension funds, with largest U.S. fund being
the half a trillion dollar Federal Retirement Thrift, followed by CalPERS with a
mere $374 billion in assets.61 Not only do these funds have the size to be a
universal owner, they also have the diversification to do. Aside from the dictates
of modern portfolio theory suggesting it is wise to do so,62 in the United States,
at least some private pension funds are legally required to offer diversified
holdings to employee beneficiaries.63 Thus, they have both the resources and the
desire to own a small slice of the vast majority of publicly traded companies, as
well indirect interests in private companies through stakes in private funds.64
Finally, and most unique to pension funds, is their ultra-long term orientation.
Pension funds owe a fiduciary duty to all beneficiaries, including younger
current employees of the relevant firm/government.65 Thus, CalPERs has an
equal duty to maximize returns for an employee of the state of California who is
twenty-five years old as they do for current pension fund beneficiaries. In the
law then, pension funds are required to not mortgage the future for higher returns
in the present.
The next group of investors who may make sense as Universal Owners are
other large asset owners, most notably sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The
Norwegian SWF is the second largest asset owner in the world, with just over
$1 trillion in assets.66 There are five other such funds in the top ten of asset
owners representing China, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Hong Kong, and
Saudi Arabia.67 While the Norwegian SWF does not appear to self-identify with

THE MOST INFLUENTIAL CAPITAL ON THE PLANET 34 (2021)
61 Id.
62 See PWC, supra note 2, at 16 for the proposition that large institutional investors rely on modern
portfolio theory. For a brief explanation of modern portfolio theory, see Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT),
Corporate Finance Institute, May 19, 2021, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/tradinginvesting/modern-portfolio-theory-mpt/.
63 See ROBERT A.G. MONKS AND NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 155 (5th ed. 2011) (“the sole
substantive requirement of [ERISA] is diversification.].
64 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS’ INVESTMENT PRACTICES AND
PERFORMANCE: 2016 DATA UPDATE 1 (2016) (pension funds investing into private equity); Investment, NASRA,
https://www.nasra.org/investment (last accessed May 24, 2021) (reporting that 47% of public pension fund
assets are in public equities, 7.4% in real estate, and 19.4% in alternative investments);
65 B.J. Richardson and Maziar Peihani, Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Finance: A Critique
of a Premature Theory, 30 BANKING AND FIN. L. REV. 405, 450 (2015).
66 THE THINKING AHEAD I NSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 34. Note that the source labels the Norwegian Fund
a pension fund, probably in part because “pension” is in its name. But it is clearly a sovereign wealth fund—it
is not a retirement fund to support a set group of beneficiaries, but a nationally owned asset managed by the
Norwegian Central Bank and funded by oil revenues as a way to create sustainable wealth instead of being
dependent upon fluctuations in the oil market. For a further description of the fund, see Gjessing and Syse, supra
note 22
67 THE THINKING AHEAD INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 34.
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the term “Universal Owner”, a 2007 article by two employees of Norges Bank
(the manager of the fund) used Universal Owner theory to analyze the fund’s
operations,68 and the fund’s logic for its focus on “responsible investment” (i.e.
focuses on sustainability and corporate governance) could be pulled out of any
essay on Universal Owners.69 Acting as a universal owner makes sense for the
Norwegian SWF, because it owns 1.5% of all publicly traded equities in the
world.70
Aside from their size and diversification, large SWFs also have a long-term
time horizon. While the concept of equal fiduciary duty to present and future
beneficiaries is not necessarily present for SWFs, they are intended to be longterm portfolios that provide a stable source of revenue for the country. It is not
a coincidence that four out of the six largest SWFs are from countries with
significant petroleum exports. As explained by Norges Bank, “The fund was set
up to shield the economy from ups and downs in oil revenue. It also serves as a
financial reserve and as a long-term savings plan so that both current and future
generations get to benefit from our oil wealth.”71 Thus, the same concern for a
stable, sustainable, long-term economy is present for SWFs.
The final group of investors who could be considered as Universal Owners
are the large index fund providers, particularly the Big Three: Vanguard,
Blackrock, and State Street.72 The literature is split on whether asset managers
like these institutions are universal owners.73 More than explicitly considering
and rejecting index fund providers as universal owners, the universal owner
literature often focuses entirely on pension funds and a few other asset owners. 74
There are two dimensions where index funds may fail to meet the criteria to be
68

Gjessing and Syse, supra note 22.
The Purpose of Responsible Investment, NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/responsible-investment/responsible-investment/ (last accessed May 19, 2021)
(explaining that it focuses on responsible investment because it invests for the long-term, globally, and widely).
70 About the fund, NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/aboutthe-fund/ (last accessed May 19, 2021).
71 Id.
72 Scott Hirst & Lucian Bebchuk, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 723 (2019)
73
Compare Thamotheram and Helen Wildsmith, supra note 4, at 440 (arguing that public pension funds
were well-suited for the Universal Owners thesis because “In comparison with corporate pension funds, major
insurance companies and large fund management firms, public pension funds are, in general, much less likely
to have conflicts of interest vis‐à‐vis their corporate sponsors or corporate clients when trying to influence
corporate behaviour”) with Quigley, supra note 4 at 2 (“Entities typically recognised as Universal Owners
include large institutional investors such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, insurance
companies, foundations, and endowments.”)
74 But see, Roberto Tallarita, Portfolio Primacy and Climate Change, SSRN (2021) for a critique of the
idea that index funds’ commitment to “portfolio primacy” creates the incentives needed for such investors to be
a powerful tool in the fight against climate change.
69
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considered a Universal Owner. The largest index mutual funds seem have the
size to meet that dimension of Universal Ownership. In terms of assets under
management, the Big Three dwarf the largest asset owners: Blackrock with
$8.68 trillion,75 Vanguard with $7.2 trillion,76 and State Street with a mere $3.5
trillion.77 Add in the fact that the point of an index fund is to provide broad
exposure to capital markets, and you have a public market where (as of 2017)
the combined Big Three are the largest shareholder in 88% of the companies in
the S&P 500.78 However, this enormous size and apparent diversification can be
a little misleading. Unlike pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, index
funds only have exposure to public markets, and many of them concentrate on
particular industries or sectors.79 Even if we only consider the funds with the
broadest portfolios, index funds are not exposed to private companies, and are
geographically concentrated in the richest countries.80 Thus, if the platonic ideal
of the Universal Owner is one who owns a slice of the entire global economy,
even the largest index funds fail to represent the entire economy. However, as
noted in Section III, a failure to be completely diversified serves more to narrow
down the applicability of the Universal Owner concept rather than completely
places one outside of the concept. That is to say, given the absolute size and
significant diversification of index funds, it seems plausible that they still bear a
significant percentage of the externalities produced by portfolio companies.
The other dimension where index funds may fail to qualify as a Universal
Owner is the issue of long-term orientation. This is due to the distinction
between asset managers and asset owners.81 Asset owners are pension funds,
SWFs, and individual people who have legal ownership of cash and other
assets.82 Asset managers are given money by asset owners to invest, and act as
agents on behalf of clients. Examples include mutual funds in public markets,83
75 About Blackrock, BLACKROCK https://www.blackrock.com/sg/en/about-us#investor-pulse (last accessed
May 25, 2021).
76 Fast Facts about Vanguard, VANGUARD https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts/ (last
accessed May 25, 2021).
77 Ilene Bieler and Carolyn Cinchon, State Street Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2020 Financial
Results, BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 19, 2021) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210119005565/en/StateStreet-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2020-FinancialResults#:~:text=With%20%2438.8%20trillion%20in%20assets,and%20employs%20approximately%2039%2
C000%20worldwide
78 Jan Ficthner, Eelke Heemskerk, and Javeier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden power of the Big Three? Passive
index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial risk, 19 BUS. AND POL. 298, 322 (2017)
79 Roberto Tallarita, Portfolio Primacy and Climate Change, SSRN, 15 (2021).
80 Id. at 16-18.
81 BLACKROCK, WHO OWNS THE ASSETS 1 (2014).
82 Id.
83 See id. at 7 (referring to mutual funds as asset managers).
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and private equity funds in private markets.84 This neat distinction is of course
complicated by the fact that asset managers, in the course of discharging their
duties to clients, typically go out and buy things. Blackrock’s index funds (which
are a type of mutual fund) do own a lot of stocks. But the point of the distinction
is to emphasize the money is ultimately supposed to return to the asset owner,
because they have the property interest in the fund and as such can be conceived
of as its owners.
Their status as mutual funds, provided by an asset manager to an ultimate
asset owner raises two issues with the long-term requirement. First, these index
mutual funds have no obligation to exist beyond next week, let alone ten years.
This is categorically unlike the permanent nature of pension funds and SWFs.
Owners of interests in the index funds can redeem them at any time in order to
get liquid or simply move their money into another investment.85 Theoretically,
everyone invested in a Vanguard index fund could decide to redeem their
interests tomorrow, and the fund would functionally end. Alternatively,
depending on the terms of the investment contract, the asset manager could have
the power to close up shop and return the value of outstanding interests to their
owners. Thus, it seems possible that the lack of a firm requirement to be
sustainable for the long-haul could make the provider of an index fund less
concerned about externalities whose costs will be borne in the future. This issue
can only take you so far though. Presumably, Blackrock and Vanguard think
they have a good business model in sponsoring these index funds and want to
continue to be in business in the coming decades, and presumably there will
always be a substantial number of investors interested in these products.
The second issue concerns the fact that asset owners usually have options
with where to put their money. Vanguard and State Street are often competing
for customers, and so may be biased towards short-term performance (and
minimally low costs of operation) in order to attract customers. While it is true
that the same short-term pressures can exist on managers of pension funds, it is
not the same as the rational institutional interest that Vanguard may have in
maximizing short-term returns. Again, this not does completely defeat the notion

84 See Private Equity, J.P. MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT, https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/assetmanagement/institutional/investment-strategies/alternatives/private-equity/ (last accessed May 25, 2021).
85 See Mutual Fund Redemption, U.S. SEC, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/glossary/mutual-fund-redemptions (last accessed May 25, 2021) (stating that mutual funds must pay
redemption proceeds within seven days of receiving a redemption request from a shareholder); Brian Mathews,
How Purchases and Redemptions Impact Index Funds, MUTUALFUNDS.COM, (Dec. 6, 2016)
https://mutualfunds.com/index-funds/how-purchases-and-redemptions-impact-index-funds/ (explaining how
redemption requests work).
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that index fund providers can have a long-term orientation, as since they are
required to own companies (of a certain size) for essentially forever (or as long
as they are in business) presumably they will be interested in the long-term
health of their portfolio companies.
Thus, I think it is fair to say that while the Big Three index fund providers
are not a perfectly clean fit into Universal Owner theory, they are close.
Supporting this “middle-ground” position on the Big Three, is the fact that these
entities have sent mixed signals on issues where Universal owners should
(theoretically) be more concerned with portfolio wide risks, than with
maximizing idiosyncratic firm-specific returns.86
III. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY VERSUS STAKEHOLDERISM
A. Sustainable Growth Primacy
Assigning Universal Owners a proper view on the shareholder primacy
versus stakeholderism debate is a tricky task, in part because there are multiple
ways to frame the debate. One sense of the concepts focuses more on
accountability questions: To whom should managers and board members be
accountable to?87 Another way to frame the accountability camp is to say that
shareholder primacy means directors must obey the wishes of their actually
existing shareholder base, usually by giving more power to shareholders.88 From
this perspective, the Universal Owner should fall clearly in the camp of
shareholder primacy. The discussion around Universal Owners usually
emphasizes the “universal” aspect of the concept, but we should not forget that
86 Compare Michael J. Coren, Blackrock is forcing finance to take climate risk seriously, QUARTZ, (Jan.
16,
2021)
https://qz.com/1957979/blackrock-is-forcing-wall-street-to-take-climate-riskseriously/#:~:text=A%20fundamental%20reshaping%20of%20finance%3A%20BlackRock%20CEO%20Larry
%20Fink%20put,change%20will%20transform%20the%20business.; Matt Philips, Exxon’s Board Defeat
Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2021 (noting that Blackrock supported Engine
Number 1’s campaign against Exxon) Levine, Index funds will save us, supra note 57. with Tallarita, supra note
79 (arguing in the context of climate change that index funds’ overrepresentation in rich emitter countries, the
imperfect nature of the stock market as a mechanism for addressing climate risk, and the agency problems of
index fund managers all suggest that the portfolio incentives of index funds are inadequate for changing
corporate behavior) and Christine Williamson, BlackRock won’t back climate shareholder proposals it considers
too prescriptive, PENSIONS& INVESTMENTS, May 10, 2022 (noting that Blackrock announced it would scale back
support of shareholder resolutions on climate change).
87 See LENORE PALLADINO AND KRISTINA KARLSSON, TOWARDS ‘ACCOUNTABLE CAPITALISM’:
REMAKING CORPORATE LAW THROUGH STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE 3 (2018) (identifying the corporation’s
board owing fiduciary duties solely to shareholders as a core component of shareholder primacy); id. at 6 (reform
proposals 2 and 3 arguing for redefining board fiduciary duties to consider other stakeholder interests and adding
stakeholder representation to boards of directors).
88 Ann Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. OF CORP. L. 297, 301 (2018).
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they are still “owners”. Indeed, their interests are in a sense, the interests of the
ownership class as such. And, as discussed in section II.A, the Universal Owner
still maintains the interest in protecting the interests of capital against labor,
when there is a fundamental conflict between the two.
Another way to conceive of the debate between shareholder primacy and
stakeholderism is to focus on the purpose of the corporation—what should
corporations view as their goal? The shareholder primacy view is most ably put
by Milton Friedman: The purpose of the corporation is to increase its profits
(within the bounds of the law).89 Thus, the purpose of the corporation is to create
shareholder value. In contrast, stakeholderism stands for the proposition that
corporations have either another purpose (to have a positive impact on society?)
or perhaps multiple specific purposes (increase shareholder value, provide
financial stability to employees, etc.).90 The Universal Owner’s view on
corporate purpose should be a different version of shareholder primacy: For
them, the purpose of the corporation is not simply to maximize shareholder
value, but to contribute to the maximization of portfolio value. It does this by
maximizing its own profits, net of any externalities or spillover effects (positive
or negative) on the economy. Of course, all investors want companies to
contribute to maximization of portfolio value, but investors with actively
managed portfolios and smaller asset pools can attempt to avoid investments that
bear the cost of negative externalities, and are unlikely to benefit as much from
positive externalities. Thus, if a firm maximizes its own value even to the
detriment of the value of other companies, it usually benefits the portfolio of
these investors, and so the question of portfolio value maximization simply
collapses into the question of individual company value maximization. To be
clear, this relationship between firm value and portfolio value is a spectrum, not
a binary, in the sense that as a “traditional” shareholder’s portfolio grows and
becomes more diversified, their perspective will begin to more resemble the
Universal Owner’s perspective.91 The two ways of conceiving the debate could
be two sides of the same coin but disentangling them is worthwhile because it
89 Steven Kaplan, The Enduring Wisdom of Milton Friedman, HARVARD LAW S CHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (Sept. 30, 2020).
90 See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE PURPOSE (2019) (arguing the purpose of the
corporation is create value for all stakeholders and not mentioning any possible accountability methods to other
stakeholders).
91 See Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott, Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with
Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 31 J. OF FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 43 (1996) (noting that
diversified shareholders should be concerned about the effects of externalities on other firms); Jarrad Harford,
Dirk Jenter, & Kai Li, Conflicts of Interests among Shareholders: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13274, 2007) 1 (finding that managers in mergers and
acquisitions “consider cross-holdings when identifying potential targets”).
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reveals that the Universal Owner may be perfectly aligned with other
shareholders in one sense (corporations are run for the benefit of shareholders)
but diverge from shareholders in another sense (how corporations benefit
shareholders).
One could analogize the Universal Owner’s portfolio to a vast company with
many pseudo-independent divisions. What should the owner of that company
view as the purpose of each division? They would want the division to contribute
to the profits of the firm, but not at the expense of other divisions in the firm.
The strategy for increasing profits is obviously not for the division to take a
bigger slice of the pie at the expense of another division, but to grow the overall
size of the pie, even if it means a smaller slice for the division. When that pie is
the entire economy, then growing the pie necessarily means growing the
economy.
Thus, one term for the Universal Owner’s version of shareholder primacy
could be “Sustainable Growth Primacy”. All of the externalities discussed above
help or harm growth in some way. Environmental externalities and monopolistic
behavior harms economic growth, while things like R&D and worker training
contribute to growth. Given the close correlation between economic growth and
long-term returns,92 it would be a very good heuristic for the Universal Owner
to simply focus on economic growth, caveated by the need for current growth to
not harm future growth, i.e., sustainable growth. I will note that I am trying to
use “sustainable” in a very broad sense: Firms’ actions could hinder or help
future economic growth in an environmental sense93 or social sense.94
Additionally, a firm’s own business model can be unsustainable for itself, i.e., it
is pursuing short-term earnings at the cost of greater longer-term value, such as
by not investing in productivity improvements at its factories in order to
maintain short-term positive earnings. As one source puts it in defining an
unsustainable business: “its current earnings borrow from future earnings.”95
As noted above and in section II.A, focusing on economic growth hides the
fact that not all forms of growth are created equal, and the Universal Owner
would prefer some forms of growth over others. Moreover, the Universal
Owner’s position would be improved without growth if it simply captured a
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Lippman, Rosan, and Seitchik, supra note 34 at 459.
See generally TRUCOST, supra note 1 (discussing the ways in which current business practices impose
costs on the future economy.
94 See OECD, supra note 9, at 93-94 and 17-18 (discussing the impact that automating jobs could have on
the middle class and the importance of a strong middle class to sustained growth).
95 MORRISON & FOERSTER AND IMPACT CAPITAL MANAGERS, LEGAL INNOVATIONS IN I MPACT INVESTING
32 (2021).
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greater share of the national income. I still believe that the phrase “Sustainable
Growth Primacy” best captures what the Universal Owner wants from individual
firms in a manner that is neither simply stating the obvious (e.g., “Portfolio
Returns Primacy”) nor too opaque (e.g., “True Shareholder Value”). Instead, it
captures that Universal Owners want their firms to be profitable, sustainable,
and good members of a much broader economic and social ecosystem. They
should not care if a firm increases its profits simply by cannibalizing market
share from another firm, and they should oppose firms growing in a manner that
externalizes costs.
The idea that portfolio value maximization is not coextensive with firm value
maximization for highly diversified shareholders has been proposed in prior
work,96 but by framing this insight as a question of corporate purpose, we can
see how Universal Owners’ perspective on the firm can radically deviate from
the standard model.
B. Divergences and Overlaps with Stakeholderism
As discussed in section III.A, Sustainable Growth Primacy differs from
stakeholderism in that it still views shareholders’ interest as having priority and
being the prime source of accountability for managers. However, there should
also be more overlap between these two views than between stakeholderism and
traditional shareholder primacy. Issues like treatment of the environment and of
customers, which are purely means to a greater end in traditional shareholder
primacy, would be put on a level playing field in Sustainable Growth Primacy.
Actions that impose environmental externalities or harm customers cannot be
justified by pointing to the increased profits realized by the firm. While an
enlightened shareholder primacy adherent would counter by arguing firm profits
will be hurt in the long run (and thus still use firm profits as the sole relevant
metric) the Universal Owner can compare those increased profits with the costs
imposed on other parties. Thus, profits to the firm are no longer the only relevant
metric; the effect on other parties is an equally valid metric, just like in
stakeholderism.

96 See Amir Rubin Diversification and Corporate Decisions, 3 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
209, 209 (2006) (“most shareholders (at least in the US, UK and Canada) are well diversified and care about
their portfolio value, and not the value of any particular firm. Corporate policies that encourage managers to
maximize equity value may be suboptimal for these diversified shareholders”) Robert G. Hansen and John R.
Lott, Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 31 J. OF FIN.
AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 43 (1996) (Diversified shareholders “do not want value maximization to be
corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms
internalize between-firm externalities”).
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Positive spillover effects also show how stakeholderism and Sustainable
Growth Primacy overlap. Things like investing in R&D, charitable giving in the
community, and education and training are all actions that are strongly justified
by both stakeholderism and Sustainable Growth Primacy. The firm as a pillar of
the community is obviously compatible with a shareholder primacy view, but it
does not fit as naturally as it does when you view the firm as one part in a greater
whole. The overlap between these two views can be summarized by stating that
both ask firms to look at other people and institutions as genuine partners and
collaborators, not as competitors or as pure means to an end.
There will be two main points of potential friction between the two views.
The first is, as I have already mentioned, Sustainable Growth Primacy still
prefers that managers be solely accountable to shareholders. There is a partial
exception to this discussed below, but for the most part the corporation will
continue to exist to serve the interests of shareholders in this view. This friction
is significant, especially if one doubts the ability of Universal Owners and other
investors to effectively monitor firms and push them to engage in all the actions
that the Universal Owner should theoretically want. The second potential point
of friction between the two views will be with the stakeholder of workers. Not
to punt on the question, but I believe the extent to which there will truly be
conflict between the groups comes down to an empirical question about growth.
I personally believe, and there is some evidence to do so,97 that sustained, strong
economic growth requires a healthy middle class and redirecting income and
power to workers can help the economy overall. That being said, it is obviously
an empirical question where particular policies or institutions that serve to
increase the power and income of workers also contribute to economic growth
enough that it outweighs any decreased profits to shareholders.
C. Divergences and Overlaps with Traditional Shareholder Primacy
I use the term “traditional shareholder primacy” to emphasize that
Sustainable Growth Primacy is a form of shareholder primacy. For the most part,
I have already addressed the divergences and overlaps between these two views.
They both agree that the current corporate governance model where managers
are agents of shareholders, and accountable primarily to them, is the appropriate
way to structure corporate governance. They also both agree that maximizing
returns writ large should be the goal of corporations, and they disagree as to
whether that should be the goal of individual firms. Thus, they will have
significant non-overlap concerning the decisions where the NPV of an action
97

OECD, supra note 9.
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(adjusted for risk, etc.) is positive for the firm, but negative when externalities
are accounted for. Conversely, the Sustainable Growth Primacy view would see
it as desirable for firms to take actions with negative NPV when the positive
externalities are great enough to render the NPV of the decision positive on the
whole. Many of the areas of agreement between stakeholderism and Sustainable
Growth Primacy discussed in the prior section can be flipped here, except of
course that the shareholder primacy advocate would agree that firms could
engage in such actions if it improved shareholder value through improvements
in brand value, reputation, customer loyalty, or employee loyalty.
It is worth addressing further how the rise of ESG investing complicates this
story. As discussed in section II.C, on a conceptual and theoretical level the
Universal Owner and the ESG investor are not interested in the same thing, even
if their interests are closer than the Universal Owner and the socially neutral
investor. However, it is worth noting that if more and more investors come to
identify as ESG investors, this distinction might cease to be anything more than
theoretical. If ESG investors sincerely believe that most negative externalities
will eventually be internalized by firms, their version of corporate purpose will
also be one where corporations need to consider externalities. The best answer
is that alignment between the two views will happen more strongly when it is
highly likely externalities will be forcibly internalized, and divergences will
happen when that is not so. For example, given the extreme visibility of the
issue, it is fairly plausible that carbon-intensive companies will have to
internalize at least some of the externalized cost of carbon emissions. In contrast,
it may be less likely that firms will be forced to internalize the costs of their
waste streams in the near future,98 which means they will continue to harm
Universal Owners without their being a plausible path to forcible internalization.
Secondly, the issue of positive externalities will also remain. Again, an ESG
investor may convincingly argue that creating positive externalities helps the
brand image of a firm or improves employee performance. But if it is
implausible to believe that a heavy manufacturer’s industrial R&D programs
will generate so much goodwill as to allow the firm to completely capture the
spillover benefits, then shareholder primacy and Sustainable Growth Primacy
would have divergent views on the appropriate level of R&D. More than any
specific disagreement as to the appropriate amount of a given activity, the point
is a Universal Owner adhering to Sustainable Growth Primacy would want
corporate managers have a fundamentally different mindset when considering
engaging in activities that have positive spillover effects like R&D programs and
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See TRUCOST, supra note 1 at 4 (reporting the externalized cost of general waste).
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worker education and training. An inability for a firm to capture all the value
created is not something to be worried over in Sustainable Growth Primacy.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND POSSIBLE TOOLS FOR UNIVERSAL OWNERS
TO OVERCOME THEM
A. Heterogenous Shareholder Interests
The fact that the Universal Owner’s rational, returns-maximizing view on
corporate purpose diverges in substantial ways from traditional shareholder
primacy is an example of how a core assumption underlying modern corporate
governance is inaccurate. This is the assumption that shareholders have
homogenous interests with respect to the firm they are invested in.99 In fact, in
many situations, shareholder interests and preferences are heterogenous. Indeed,
as one 2015 paper points out, all shareholders are either humans with
consciences or fiduciary institutions working on behalf of humans with
consciences and so (one would hope) that for all shareholders who are not
sociopaths “there is some body count that would be unacceptable for a set level
of profits.”100 This demonstrates that most shareholders do consider morality in
some form when considering whether they would want a portfolio company to
take an action that would increase profits.101 And of course, the fact that most
people have different senses of ethics and morality means that in most situations,
shareholders would not agree with each other about the proper weight to assign
moral concerns.
Shareholders can have heterogeneous preferences as a result of their
financial and economic interests as well. Preferences can diverge when
shareholders are also debtholders of the firm, or when they are also employees.
The former may be more risk-averse than the typical shareholder (as their debt
interests will not capture any upside) even when a firm action may be risky but
still have a positive NPV.102 Similarly, one would expect shareholder-employees
to resist cost cutting measures that cut labor costs (i.e., layoffs or slashing of
benefits), even if there was strong reason to believe that such actions would have
99 Andrzej Rapaczynski, Impact Investing as a Form of Lobby and its Corporate Governance Effects, 11
CAPITALISM AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (2016).
100 Paul D. Weitzel and Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the Inevitable Role of
Conscience, 12 NYU J. OF LAW & BUS. 35, 36 (2014).
101 Weitzel and Rodgers, supra note 100 at 43.
102 Generally, one would expect a shareholder with at least some diversification to almost always prefer
firms to take actions with a high NPV, even if they are highly risky. See Ying Dou, Ronald Masulis, & Jason
Zein, Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Insider Pledging of Company Stock as Collateral for Personal
Loans, ECGI Working Papers in Finance, 3 (2019).
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a positive NPV. With the rise of Silicon Valley and venture-backed firms, one
increasingly important source of heterogeneity is the conflict between preferred
shareholders and common shareholders. Courts have had to adjudicate disputes
between venture capital shareholders who own preferred stock, and common
shareholders who own common stock.103 Finally, as noted in Section IV,
diversification can give rise to divergent shareholder interests. A shareholder
whose holdings are concentrated in the firm will have different preferences, than
a shareholder whose holdings are broadly diversified, particularly in the
acquisitions context where the diversified shareholder owns equity in both the
target and the acquirer.104
The upshot of this heterogeneity isn’t simply that it is interesting from an
academic perspective, but that if some of the suggested tools of corporate
governance rely on the basic assumption of homogenous shareholder interests,
the realty of heterogenous interests can undercut their utility. Corporate
governance exists to solve the perceived core conflict in corporations—that of
the conflict between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers) in
the corporate relationship.105 Implicit in this picture is the idea that shareholders
have the same interests with respect to the corporation.106 However, if the
principals themselves have serious conflicts, it makes treating them as a unitary
whole less sensible. In particular, the existence of heterogenous interests means
the rationale for the shareholder franchise breaks down. 107 The reason for this is
it is argued shareholder voting is valuable in two ways.108 It reduces agency costs
by allowing shareholders to punish misbehaving directors or replace them, and
it acts as a coordination mechanism to allow shareholders to express their
preferences to the directors.109 Because both of these arguments are rooted in the
assumption that shareholders have a uniform set of preferences and goals, the

103 See Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. Oak Hill Capital Partners III, L.P., 2020 WL 2111476, 1-2 (Del. Ch.
2020) (summarizing that the dispute was between common shareholders and the leading venture capital firm
concerning the fairness of how the common stock was treated); In Re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 73
A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) (summarizing opinion by noting this is a dispute between VC directors and a
common shareholder arising out of their different liquidation preferences).
104
Jarrad Harford, Dirk Jenter, & Kai Li, Conflicts of Interests among Shareholders: The Case of Corporate
Acquisitions 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13274, 2007).
105 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and REINIER Kraakman, AGENCY PROBLEMS, LEGAL STRATEGIES, AND
ENFORCEMENT, 2 in the ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, Reinier
Kraakman, et al. (2009).
106 Id.
107 Ann Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. of Corp. L. 297, 304 (2018) citing Rapazynski;
Martin/Portnoy.
108 See id.
109 Id.
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existence of heterogeneous preferences undercuts both arguments. 110 Not only
could it make the franchise less effective at both of these functions, the problem
of shareholder oppression111 means that placing more it has been argued that
placing more power in the hands of shareholders could lead to unfair treatment
of the minority, or destruction of shareholder wealth by allowing the majority to
advance their private interests at the expense of the good of the corporation.112
Thus, resolving how to negotiate conflicts of interest between shareholders
is an important question for corporate law. There has been an increase in efforts,
especially at the level of federal securities law, to facilitate increased shareholder
power relative to managerial power,113 which would in practice empower the
majority camp in situations of shareholder conflict. However, in large part
corporate law has consistently that since fiduciary duties are owed to the
corporation, and not to shareholders directly, directors and managers have a duty
to maximize the value of the corporation.114 Because shareholders are the
residual claimants of the firm,115 maximizing the value of the firm collapses into
maximizing shareholder’s equity stake, which is seen to be in the best interest
of the shareholder:
I take it as non-controversial that, under established and conventional
conceptions, directors owe duties of loyalty to the corporation and to
the shareholders; that this conjunctive expression is not usually
problematic because the interests of the shareholders as a class are seen
as congruent with those of the corporation in the long run.116

As a corollary to this, directors’ duties to shareholders stop at the water’s
edge of the corporation. Moreover, the caselaw makes clear that when the
preferences of shareholders are incongruent with maximizing the value of the
corporation, directors are under no fiduciary obligation to obey them.117 As In
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Id.
Gerard Mantese & David Hansma, Shareholder Oppression, Fiduciary Duty, and Partnership Litigation
in Closely Held Companies, SRR JOURNAL SPRING (2014).
112 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA. L. REV. 561, 561
(2005).
113
Lipton, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 314.
114 TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, 7 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1989), In re Trados,
115 TW Services, Inc supra at note 117; In re Trados supra at note 117.
116 TW Services, Inc supra at note 117.
117 See In Re Trados, supra note 102103 at 38 (“Stockholders may have idiosyncratic reasons for preferring
decisions that misallocate capital. Directors must exercise their independent fiduciary judgment; they need not
cater to stockholder whim”); Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 78880, at 30 (“The
corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are
obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the
duty to manage the firm”).
111
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Re Trados, a recent case in this line put it: “Stockholders may have idiosyncratic
reasons for preferring decisions that misallocate capital. Directors must exercise
their independent fiduciary judgment; they need not cater to stockholder
whim.”118 In sum, insofar as it is accurate to say that directors and managers owe
a fiduciary duty to shareholders, it is only qua shareholders of the particular
company they manage. That is to say, fiduciary duty does not require managers
to care about the other holdings and interests (financial and otherwise) of the
shareholders of their company—it does require them to care about the value of
one particular holding (the company that they manage).119
From this core point, it follows that not only do directors not have an
obligation to listen to shareholders’ “whims”, doing so could be in breach of
their fiduciary duty if it would harm the value of the firm. Thus, one could say
that directors manage the company not on behalf of actually existing
shareholders, but on behalf of a hypothetical, idealized, shareholder: The
shareholder’s whose only concern is maximizing the long-term value of their
investment into the firm. For the actual shareholders, directors are required to
manage the company in accord with their preferences to the extent that their
preferences conform to this platonic ideal of a shareholder. Thus, we have a
principle for resolving conflicts between shareholders with heterogenous
interests: Directors and managers are obliged to side with the shareholder whose
preference more closely aligns them with this hypothetical idealized
shareholder—who cares about nothing other than the value of their investment.
For shareholder-debtholders, directors have no fiduciary duty to maximize
the value of their debt instruments, because that financial interest does arise from
their capacity as a shareholder. For shareholder-employees, directors have no
fiduciary duty to maintain protect their labor interests, because that interest does
not arise from their capacity as a shareholder. Finally, for preferred stockholders,
directors have no fiduciary duty to protect their special contractual rights,
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In Re Trados, supra note 102103 at 38.
See supra note 114; The Delaware Way: Deference to the Business Judgment of Directors Who Act
Loyally and Carefully, DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-way-businessjudgment/#:~:text=Delaware%20law%20requires%20directors%20to,consideration%20to%20their%20self%2
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because it does not arise from their capacity as a shareholder. 120 Similarly, with
respect to heterogenous moral beliefs and risk preferences, directors are obliged
to act in accordance with these preferences only to the extent they reasonably
believe such preferences align with the long-term value of the company. While
of course for some of these groups these groups there are contractual rights that
directors and managers must honor, when they are making discretionary
decisions, they cannot privilege the interests of these groups above the interests
of the shareholders who lack such idiosyncratic interests. In In re Trados, the
Delaware Chancery Court found that VC directors (who were holders of
preferred stock) did not meet the standard of conduct with respect to fair dealing
in negotiating an acquisition of the company, precisely because they failed to act
from the perspective of regular stockholders:
In this case, the VC directors pursued the Merger because Trados did
not offer sufficient risk-adjusted upside to warrant either the
continuing investment of their time and energy or their funds’ ongoing
exposure to the possibility of capital loss. An exit addressed these risks
by enabling the VCs to devote personal resources to other, more
promising investments and by returning their funds’ invested capital
plus a modest return. The VC directors did not make this decision after
evaluating Trados from the perspective of the common stockholders,
but rather as holders of preferred stock with contractual cash flow
rights that diverged materially from those of the common stock and
who sought to generate returns consistent with their VC funds’
business model.121

The efficient markets hypothesis could be applied to argue that conflicts
between shareholder interests are not problematic, even for the shareholder who
potentially “loses” from the resolution of the conflict, because if the resolution
is viewed as suboptimal by the marketplace as a whole, the share price will be
negatively affected. In an efficient market, the current stock price will reflect the
market’s perception of the firm’s long-term to generate cash.122 The efficient
markets hypothesis proposes that in a sufficiently efficient market, such as the
public stock market, all publicly available information is reflected in the stock
price.123 If a firm makes a decision, and a sufficient share of the marketplace
120 See In Re Trados, supra note 102103 at 39-40 (“A board does not owe fiduciary duties to preferred
stockholders when considering whether or not to take corporate action that might trigger or circumvent the
preferred stockholders’ contractual rights. Preferred stockholders are owed fiduciary duties only when they do
not invoke their special contractual rights and rely on a right shared equally with the common stock”).
121 Id. at 56
122 Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and its Critics, 17 J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
59, 59 (2003).
123 Id.
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believes the decision negatively affects the long-run prospects of the firm, then
the share price of the firm will be negatively affected. Thus, regardless of how
corporate law addresses shareholder conflicts, the market will be reward those
firms whose resolution is perceived to enhance the long-term value of the
company and punish those firms whose resolution does not. While this claim has
been proposed in the context of conflicts between short-term and long-term
shareholders, the same basic principle could apply to other cases of shareholder
conflict. For example, in the case of shareholders with different risk preferences,
an efficient market will adjust the expected value of future cash flows according
to the perceived riskiness of the firm’s strategy. Thus, if one buys this story, then
the problem of heterogenous shareholder interests really is not a problem at all
in many cases, because the market will incorporate shareholder preferences in
pricing stocks, even when corporate law resolves against certain groups of
shareholders.
B. Heterogenous Shareholder Interests and Universal Owners
The relevancy of the issue of heterogenous shareholder interests and
Universal Owners should be obvious. A Universal Owner may own shares in
many companies, but rarely would it be a majority owner on its own. It may
have an interest in the company internalizing externalities, but from a purely
profit-maximizing perspective the non-universal owners in the company likely
do not. It is powerless to affect corporate change then. The problem gets a little
better if it is the case that Universal Owners collectively own a majority of the
company. If we consider the Big Three to be Universal Owners, then this is
likely the case for many publicly traded U.S. companies.124 In this scenario, if
the Universal Owners all agree on some form of Sustainable Growth Primacy,
they can act to make their voices heard at the company. Whether through voting
for directors or engaging with the directors, the problem at this point becomes
more of a collective action problem (which of course is significant in its own
right). If they succeed, managers will be forced to listen to them (since they are
a majority). However, for most companies it will likely be the case that there are
also shareholders who lack the Universal Owner perspective. Whether retail
investors, actively managed mutual funds, hedge funds, or others, there will
almost certainly be investors whose lack of size, diversification, or long-term
orientation gives them a different perspective on the purpose of the corporation.
In other words, heterogeneity of interests. As discussed in the prior section,
124 See A. DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., OWNERS OF THE WORLD’ S LISTED COMPANIES 11, 6 (2019) (reporting that
72% of all owned equities in the U.S. are owned by institutional investors and the “the average combined
ownership held by a company’s 10 largest institutional investors is 43%”).
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when shareholders have heterogenous interests, the fact that 1) fiduciary duties
are owed to the corporation and not the shareholders and 2) the content of such
duties require managers to maximize the long-term value of the corporation,
means that the shareholder whose interest most aligns with 2) will be the
shareholder whose interests are protected. In many scenarios, if the Universal
Owners are able to elect boards that align with their interests, the managers will
be able to take Universal Owner-friendly actions. Under the business judgement
rule managers can be protected in taking actions to internalize negative
externalities or reduce the deadweight loss in an oligopolistic market, so long as
they can plausibly argue they were doing so to promote long-term shareholder
value.125 As discussed in previous sections, there are plausible arguments that
reducing production of negative externalities and increasing production of
positive externalities will improve the long-term value of the company, through
enhanced reputational benefits or reduced regulatory risk.
However, there is a fundamental limitation on how far managers can go with
these Universal Owner-friendly actions. They cannot take actions that they
believe would destroy firm value (even if it benefits the majority of their
shareholders) without triggering a credible claim of breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of their shareholders. Thus, the more radical potential implications of
Sustainable Growth Primacy cannot be realized. Consider the example of drug
pricing discussed in II.C.iii. Suppose Universal Owners seized control of a
majority of the shares of one of the three manufacturers of insulin in the United
States.126 The Universal Owners may have very good empirical evidence and
modeling to support the proposition that slashing insulin costs would be so
beneficial to the U.S. economy that it would redound to their benefit even if the
company saw lower profits over the long-term. Management’s ability to
implement this vision127 would be fundamentally constrained by the fact that it
would have to be justified in terms of maximizing long-term shareholder value
of this particular company. While it is not implausible to argue cutting prices
would build goodwill with customers and regulators, and it would enable the
company to gain a larger market share at the expense of competitors, that
125
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971) (stating that when the business judgment rule
applies “A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be
disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose”).
126 William T. Cefalu, Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group: Conclusions and
Recommendations, 41 DIABTES CARE 1299, 1300 (2018).
127 This of course assumes management has a desire to do so—they may have independent motivations to
resist what they perceive to be radical changes to the firm’s purpose. But in this discussion, we can assume that
if the Universal Owners can apply the right pressure to the board, they can have some success finding the right
managers to implement their vision, or as discussed infra compensate managers in a manner that aligns
incentives.
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argument can only take you so far. First, the price to which they could cut insulin
and still plausibly claim they were maximizing shareholder value may be higher
than the optimal price from a Sustainable Growth Primacy perspective. Second,
it just requires management and the Universal Owners to engage in an ungainly
rigmarole, where they have to hide their true intentions and true goals for the
company.
It should also be noted that the solution of “efficient markets” is particularly
unsatisfactory for Universal Owners. The efficient markets hypothesis states that
all publicly available information related to a firm’s prospects will be reflected
in the share price.128 At best for the Universal Owners, an efficiently priced firm
will reflect the potential for regulatory risk or other risks related to a firm’s
production of externalities. However, as discussed in section II.C.i, this
argument (essentially the one ESG investors make) is categorically different
from the argument Universal Owners make, which is that they face costs from
firm behavior that are unrelated to the firm’s ability to generate cash flows and
will persist even if the firm is never forced to internalize such costs.
The problem of heterogenous shareholder interests has been surprisingly
ignored in the literature on Universal Owners, including critiques of the
Universal Owner concept. The one source that spent any time on the issue was
Lippman et al.: They briefly argue that Universal Owners should focus on
government policy changes to achieve the goal of lower drug price, because
corporate boards will be reluctant to reduce profits as they “have their own
fiduciary duties to act in the long-term interest of company shareholders.”129 The
next closest to this point comes from Gjessing and Syse, whose critique focuses
on management perspectives rather than fiduciary duties, but drives at the same
point:
The purpose of companies is to set capital to work. What investors, as
owners, ask company management to do is to obtain the highest return
possible on the capital. This is the simple, yet powerful, mission of
investment. This does not capture external effects, and investors may
therefore engage with management (boards can in this respect be seen
as part of the management) to try to persuade the company to take into
account not only the return on capital in that company, but also more
complex investor interests…investors must ask themselves whether
they have much persuasive power when on the one hand they hold
management responsible for achieving the required rate of return, and
on the other hand challenge them to forego profitable opportunities for
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the sake of something the investor, in a discretionary way,
characterises as their portfolio interests…Hence, asking management
to divert from profit maximisation in order to pursue a portfolio
interest of the investor will be difficult, especially when universal
owner arguments are still the exception rather than the rule.130

This is an older source, and so does not consider the growth in interest in
ESG investing and new forms of corporate purpose, but it lines up with the
fiduciary duty issues identified here. Searching the rest of the literature for
discussions of fiduciary duty, one only finds discussions of duties owed by
pension fund trustees to beneficiaries.131 Before moving into some proposed
solutions, I will speculate and add that the existence of this problem perhaps
explains why, if Universal Owners are trying to implement their vision at
portfolio companies, their level of success has varied from issue area to issue
area. Corporate governance has long been identified as an area of interest to
Universal Owners because they have an interest in standardized, shareholderfriendly governance across the entire economy,132 and it is also an area where
pension funds like CalPERs have been credited as being highly successful
activists.133 It may not be a coincidence that this is an area where non-Universal
Owner interests clearly align with theirs. In contrast, it was only with the recent
explosion of interest in climate change and ESG investing have we begun to see
any traction in shareholders forcing fossil fuel companies to internalize their
negative externalities.134
My first suggestion for addressing this problem cuts across all three of the
next suggestions but is worth highlighting in its own right. Universal Owners
should work together on these issues as much as possible. Collaboration is a
frequently proposed strategy for Universal Owners because it solves the
collective action problems generated by the fact that each Universal Owner
would prefer the others to bear the costs of changing portfolio company
behavior, since they all gain from any improvements.135 But it is an important
suggestion for overcoming collective action problems and enabling the pooling
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of resources for institutions like pension funds that—as rich as they are on
paper—are often underfunded relative to liabilities.136 Importantly, given that
some boards may resist even moderate changes in the direction of Sustainable
Growth Primacy, it is plausible that Universal Owners would have to work
together to nominate and elect a full new slate of board members.
The second suggestion is to work to persuade the non-Universal Owner
investors to support a vision of corporate purpose that is, if not Sustainable
Growth Primacy, a more expansive, long-term, notion of shareholder primacy.
In other words, try to convince your fellow shareholders to become ESG
investors, whether at the company level or at the market level. This will help
increase buy-in for at least some actions that are in accord with Sustainable
Growth Primacy, though as noted in section IV.C it may have a ceiling,
depending on the issue area.
The third suggestion is to focus on government policy as the avenue for
implementing Sustainable Growth Primacy. This has been suggested in the
literature on Universal Owners as well.137 After all, the classic story of
externalities is that they are a market failure that demands government
intervention to correct. Universal Owners may have an interest in forcing
companies to internalize their negative externalities and producing more positive
externalities. But just because one has an interest, does not mean one has the
power. Governments have the power to regulate environmental harms and other
social ills. On the positive externalities side, it may make more sense for
Universal Owners to prefer higher taxes and government provision of goods like
worker training and research, rather than firms. This proposal solves the
Corporate Fiduciary Duty issue because managers’ obligation to obey the law
outweighs any duty to maximize profits. Pursuing policy changes rather than
trying to force through radical changes at the corporation also helps with a
similar problem: Even if Universal Owners are a majority and able to coordinate
such that they can pressure boards, unless they are able to successfully elect a
board that shares their vision, managers may resist actions they think would
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harm firm profitability, even absent a fiduciary duty.138 Thus, have the
government bear the burden of forcing managers to implement your desired
changes. To continue with the tangent, the issue of manager resistance suggests
that changing standard compensation packages to better align incentives
between managers and Universal Owners could be another tool in the Universal
Owner toolbox. Perhaps tying some portion of management compensation to
their performance on certain ESG metrics would be one method of doing so.139
One interesting wrinkle with the government policy route, is that it forces
Universal Owners to consider the tradeoff between having less control over the
precise actions of the firm (as presumably government policy will be informed
by the input of other stakeholders as well) versus having a greater likelihood of
success at actually changing firm behavior. In other words, if the Universal
Owner concludes it cannot, through other means, convince portfolio companies
to adopt sustainable growth principles for a particular issue area, it must decide
whether it must live with the suboptimal firm performance or push for policies
that may have be suboptimal in a different way.
The final suggestion is to use alternative corporate forms like public benefit
corporations (PBCs). Universal Owners can push for companies to convert to
these alternative forms. At first glance, PBCs seem to be the opposite of what a
Universal Owner would want, since they theoretically insulate management
from shareholder pressure. However, it is important to keep in mind that even in
a PBC, shareholder democracy still exists. Though shareholder voting is far from
a perfect mechanism of holding management accountable, 140 it is a viable
avenue. If directors and officers are acting in ways that shareholders do not like,
they can always vote for a new board. Thus, if Universal Owners own a majority
of the corporation, its status as a PBC would not necessarily affect their ability
to hold management accountable. But it would insulate management from
pressure from minority shareholders. Because the PBC has a requirement that
the directors “balance” shareholder value against the specific corporate interest
as well as the general public interest, PBCs allow for directors to explicitly
promote aims other than profit maximization, such as reducing environmental
138 See Lippman, supra note 34, at 465 (“However, [boards] are unlikely to act to benefit universal investors
at a material expense to their own company’s profitability and shareholder returns. For this reason, universal
investors could benefit from supporting public policies that advance their overall interest in limiting drug
prices”).
139 See Michael Drew, The Puzzle of Financial Reporting and Corporate Short- Termism: A Universal
Ownership Perspective, 19 AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REV. 295, 300 (2010) (suggesting a range of
compensation options to incentivize more long-term oriented behavior from managers).
140 David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, 2 ANNUAL REV. OF FIN. ECON. 103,
104-05 (2010) (discussing some of the potential costs of shareholder voting).
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harm.141 The statute requires directors to balance the 1) financial interests of
stockholders 2) the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct and 3) the specified public benefits identified its
certificate of incorporation.142 Therefore, in a PBC managers would not violate
their fiduciary duty simply because they sacrificed some shareholder value in
order to make drug prices more affordable or in order to make their operations
less environmentally harmful. In one sense, this unique duty imposed on
directors in the PBC shifts perspective to resemble that of the Universal Owners:
Rather than narrowly focusing on extracting as much profits as possible from
one firm, directors can now consider the effects of their actions on other
stakeholders, e.g., the effects of unpriced externalities.
It should be noted that any of these suggestions may have undesirable other
consequences for the Universal Owner. For example, if access to capital is
inhibited at companies because prospective investors fear being in a minority
position where they perceive they will be exploited by the Universal Owner
majority faction, the corporation’s long-term value may be severely diminished
with no commensurate offsetting gain at other portfolio companies. This harm
would of course harm the Universal Owners. As discussed above, policy
changes that help solve one problem for Universal Owners could have negative
consequences in a different dimension (e.g., higher taxes on corporate profits to
pay for expanded higher education). The point of offering these suggestions is
to illuminate the fact that resolving this problem will require Universal Owners
to take potentially unorthodox steps, such as asking for greater government
regulation or embracing new corporate forms.
V. CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Whether or not Sustainable Growth Primacy is embraced whole-heartedly
by Universal Owners, it is useful because it helps us better understand actions
taken by Universal Owners. One way to read Larry Fink’s letters on corporate
purpose143 is that they are simply efforts to get portfolio companies to realize
their individual long-term value is maximized by embracing a corporate
purpose. And I do believe Fink believes this to be true. However, it is worth
141 See DEL. CODE. tit. 8 §365(a) (requiring directors to run the PBC “in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation”).
142 Id.
143 Larry Fink, Profit & Purpose, BLACKR OCK (2019) https://www.blackrock.com/americasoffshore/en/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter ; Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (2018)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter.

2022]

HOW SHOULD UNIVERSAL OWNERS VIEW CORPORATE PURPOSE?

141

pointing out that even if some companies do not see a rise in long-term value as
a result of considering their impacts on society and the environment, Blackrock’s
portfolio will benefit regardless, if these firms reduce their production of
negative externalities. Thus, Blackrock wins either way. While one could argue
that the efforts by Universal Owners to push pharmaceutical companies to
cooperate on Covid-19144 was rooted in an attempt to maximize these firms’
long-term value, it seems more plausible any enhanced reputational benefits
were secondary to the main purpose of returning the economy (i.e., their
portfolios) to a sense of normalcy and continued growth.145
With regards to the deadweight loss from oligopolistic markets, one study
found that Big Three ownership in the airline industry is associated with lower
prices.146 The Norwegian SWF couches its work on climate change in the
language of portfolio-wide, long-term “sustainable growth.”147 In their 2000
article introducing the concept, Hawley and Williams argue that the Universal
Owner concept helps us understand why it is pension funds who take the lead
on corporate governance efforts at individual funds, because making an example
of a few firms leads to positive spillover effects at nontargeted firms (which are
also owned by Universal Owners).148 This phenomenon of “making an example”
out of a few target companies could be applicable to solving the Corporate
Fiduciary Duty problem. Finally, the Engine One Campaign against Exxon
appears to have succeeded in electing more climate-friendly directors.149 While
it is notable that investor pressure led to this outcome, it is even more notable
for this paper’s purposes who voted for the new slate: The three largest pension
funds in the United States, and Blackrock.150 If Exxon actually takes action to
more rapidly shift to a low-carbon business model and reduce emissions, these
four Universal Owners will win either way: Either it improves shareholder value
and Exxon’s owners benefit, or it does not but the Universal Owner’s portfolio
benefits because it bears less of the externalized costs. While there are more
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examples, the point is not that Universal Owners have actually whole-heartedly
embraced this vision of corporate purpose, but that Sustainable Growth Primacy
can help us understand some of their motivations behind some of their activism.
In order to continue to implement this vision across their portfolios, work is
being done to solve some of the barriers to the implementation of Universal
Owner concepts at firms, such as by creating more actionable data,151 and
improving the managerial capacities of institutional investors. 152 Along with
solving these problems, Universal Owners have a number of positive tools in the
toolkit for implementing this vision of corporate purpose. The four suggestions
in section IV.A for solving the Corporate Fiduciary Duty problem are also
relevant for implementing Sustainable Growth Primacy generally, especially
pushing for government policy changes. Along with these suggestions, I would
add two more important tools. The first is shareholder engagement, an existing
popular tool for Universal Owners.153 Universal Owners typically do not exit
companies, but they can engage with management on issues they care about. The
good news for Universal Owners is that engagement can have real, lasting
effects on companies. A recent paper studied the impact of environmental
activist investing efforts and found that targeted firms reduced emissions of
greenhouse gases and other pollutants, and increased expenditures on pollution
abatement.154 Of course, with primary market investments, such as in private
markets or secondary issuances in public markets, Universal Owners can use the
promise of their capital to channel issuers towards alignment with Sustainable
Growth Primacy, and withhold capital from particularly non-aligned
investments.155 In contrast, in secondary markets withholding capital has little
(economic) effect, and so engagement and voting are more important
strategies.156
Finally, if sustainable growth will be the goal of Universal Owners, they will
need a set of metrics and measurements that quantify a company’s contribution
to, or detraction from, sustainable growth. These metrics may overlap with, but
are not the same as, the work being done by the Sustainable Accounting
Standards Board (SASB) to create ESG metrics that are financially material for
151
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investors.157 As this paper has made clear, what is material to a Universal Owner
may not be material even to an ESG investor. In essence, Sustainable Growth
Primacy suggests that it would be desirable for companies to produce balance
sheets with all of its “true” liabilities and expenses, as well as its “true” assets
and revenues, i.e., its positive and negative spillover effects. To give one
tangible example, natural capital accounting is a method of valuing ecosystem
services, in order to assess the true costs of developing a given area.158
Sustainable Growth Primacy suggests that companies, when making decisions
that affect ecosystems, should use natural capital accounting to assess whether
losses of natural capital are greater than the positive cash flows generated by the
decision. If so, then it is possible that the net effect on Universal Owners’
portfolios would be negative.
CONCLUSION
With the massive growth in index strategies and the continued growth of
large asset owners like pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, there is little
doubt that the Universal Owner will continue to be an important concept for our
understanding of modern capitalism. As this paper makes clear, their unique
economic interest means they should have a perspective on corporate purpose
that is fundamentally different from either the traditional shareholder primacy
view or the stakeholderism perspective. However, just because they have a
unique interest and are powerful players does not mean their interest will always
be translated into a real-world impact. There are serious legal, institutional, and
epistemic (i.e., relating to actionable data) barriers that can prevent Universal
Owners from advancing this notion of corporate purpose. While there are
positive trends from their perspective (the rise in ESG investing, growth in
sophisticated modeling of some externalities) it is by no means certain their
vision of corporate purpose will prevail. How Universal Owners attempt to
overcome these barriers, and whether they are successful, will have important
consequences for the continued development of modern capitalism and the
response to the climate crisis.
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